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An institution in decay 
Fifteen years ago Ross Parsons published his Wilfred Fullagar 
Lecture in the Australian Tax Forum. His subject was 
“Income Taxation–an Institution in Decay”.3 His lecture was 
influential. Scholars cite it regularly. This evening I shall 
consider Parsons’s thesis and evaluate it from several points 
of view: factually, historically, philosophically, and as a 
prophecy that society would abandon income taxation. 
Parsons’s fundamental position was that, “The analytical 
fabric of the income tax … had congenital and … incurable 
defects, born as it was of a union of institutions which had no 
common policies”. The institutions to which he referred were 
first the income tax itself, and secondly the concept of 
income. In Parsons’s opinion, income tax adopted the concept 
of income from the law of trusts, which, he explained, is 
based on principles that are different from and irrelevant to 
the policies and imperatives of income tax law.4 
                                         
1 This paper is a revised version of the author’s inaugural Ross Parsons 
Memorial Lecture, delivered in Sydney on 14 June 2001. It is due to be 
published in due course as an article in the Sydney University Law 
Review. Comments, please, to John.Prebble@vuw.ac.nz. 
2 BA, LLB (hons) (Auckland); BCL (Oxon); JSD (Cornell); Inner Temple. 
Professor and former Dean of Law at Victoria University, Wellington, 
New Zealand. www.vuw.ac.nz/~prebble. 
3 (1986) 3 Australian Tax Forum 233. 
4 Id 238 – 240. 
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Parsons chose the Simons5 definition as the appropriate 
benchmark against which to test the judicial concept of 
income that has developed in Australian and United Kingdom 
law. Essentially, Simons said that the tax base should embrace 
all economic gains, but that it should embrace only economic 
gains.6 Parsons explained that the Australian tax base fails on 
both counts. 
There are several fundamental problems with the judicial 
concept of income, that is, the concept of income that the 
courts employ for tax purposes. First, the judicial concept sees 
income as a flow, rather than as a gain. Secondly, as a 
consequence, it taxes some apparent flows that do not entail 
gains. Thirdly, it omits gains that we call capital gains. 
Australia attempted to remedy that shortcoming by bolting a 
capital gains tax onto the income tax in 1986.7 Fourthly, it 
relies on legal transactions rather than on underlying 
economic movements. I shall return several times to this 
fourth point during this lecture. 
Ross Parsons would agree with me that the shortcomings 
that I have just listed are not stand-alone defects of income 
taxation but symptoms of the analytical shortcomings of the 
concept of income. I shall continue from here in a moment, 
after considering some history. 
History 
One way in which Parsons has been influential is in respect of 
his opinion that tax law adopted its concept of income from 
trust law. Nowadays a number of other people hold this belief 
and have written about it. When I find these people I ask them 
for their source. The source is invariably Parsons.8 On the 
other hand, Parsons himself cites as his only authority Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v Blott9. Parsons argued that the 
                                         
5 Simons, H, Personal Income Taxation. The Definition of Income as a 
Problem of Fiscal Policy (1938) Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
50-51. 
6 Idem. Simons’s full definition was: “Personal income may be defined as 
the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in 
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights 
between the beginning and end of the period in question. In other words, it 
is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the period to 
‘wealth’ at the end of the period and then subtracting ‘wealth’ at the 
beginning. The sine qua non of income is gain as our courts have 
recognised in their more lucid moments–and gain to someone during a 
specified time interval.” 
7 Income Tax Assessment (Capital Gains) Act 1986. 
8 The present author is among these people. Prebble, J, “Why is tax law 
incomprehensible?” [1994] British Tax Review, 380, 388. 
9 [1921] AC 171. 
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House of Lords in the Blott case used the trust case of Bouche 
v Sproule10 to conclude that a bonus issue of shares was not 
income for purposes of the United Kingdom income tax. Even 
if Parsons had been correct in his analysis of Blott’s case, it 
would not necessarily follow that trust law was the source of 
the concept of income for tax law. In fact, if anything, Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v Blott taken together with Bouche v 
Sproule establishes the opposite. The majority11 in Blott first, 
and independently, establishes the parameters of the concept 
of income.12 They then turn to Bouche v Sproule merely as 
confirmation of their conclusion,13 not as the source of it. The 
two branches of the law draw separately on the same concept 
of income, a concept of income that exists independently from 
either of those two branches. As Viscount Finlay put it,14 
The question whether it was income or capital could not be 
affected by the purpose which led to the institution of the inquiry. 
The fundamentals of the legal concept of income that the 
House of Lords deployed in Inland Revenue Commissioners v 
Blott remain with us today, but they have a history that goes 
back at least to the poll taxes of the seventeenth century. As 
their name implies, poll taxes were capitation taxes, but 
Parliament levied them on a progressive scale. Discovering 
people’s income was either impractical or intrusive. Instead, 
the graduation used ranks and occupations as a surrogate, to 
tax income indirectly, on the assumption that people’s income 
corresponded with their position in life. For instance, the poll 
tax of 1641 levied £100 on dukes, with rates falling through to 
ranks of nobility to £10 on esquires.15 
The assessed taxes of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries also approached income asymptotically, though they 
chose expenditure, not rank, as an appropriate surrogate for 
income. The hearth tax of 166216 was an early example, 
imposing tax on the basis of the numbers of fireplaces in 
people’s houses. The window tax of 1695,17 charged two 
shillings a year to the occupant of each dwellinghouse, with 
higher rates for larger houses. The tax estimated size by 
counting windows, assessing an additional four shillings if 
                                         
10 (1887) 12 App Cas 385. 
11 Viscounts Haldane, Finlay, and Cave. Lords Dunedin and Sumner 
dissented. 
12 [1921] AC 171, 184 (Viscount Haldane), 196 (Viscount Finlay), 200 
(Viscount Cave). 
13 [1921] AC 171, 185 ff (Viscount Haldane), 197 ff (Viscount Finlay),  
201 ff (Viscount Cave). 
14 [1921] AC 171, 197. 
15 16 Chas I c 9. 
16 14 Car II, c 10. 
17 7 & 8 Will III c 18 (1695-96). 
Working Paper: Do not Cite 
Parsons Lect Working Paper 2 
5 
one’s house had ten windows, and eight shillings for houses 
with twenty or more windows. In effect, the hearth and 
window taxes achieved a form of taxation that was doubly 
indirect. They used one surrogate (numbers of hearths and 
windows) to estimate another (size of house) which itself was 
a surrogate for people’s income. New assessed taxes in the 
eighteenth century cut out one step of indirectness and 
imposed duties on items that were considered to be luxurious, 
such as horses, carriages,18 clocks and watches,19 dogs, and 
male servants.20 
The assessed taxes proved inadequate to fund the 
Napoleonic Wars at the end of the eighteenth century. 
Parliament’s initial response was to increase the rates, which 
resulted in the Triple Assessment of 1798,21 promoted by Pitt 
as an emergency war tax. Like the assessed taxes that 
preceded it, the Triple Assessment used expenditure in an 
effort to assess income. The Triple Assessment required 
people to pay the same amount that they paid in 1797 again, 
and in addition an extra assessment of the 1797 amount, 
multiplied by factors that increased in proportion to the totals 
of the 1797 payments.  
Originally, Pitt intended to triple the amounts paid on 
items of special luxury.22 This intention appears to be the 
origin of the name, “Triple Assessment”.23 In the event the 
multipliers chosen varied from one tenth to five.24 It is evident 
from Pitt’s comments that he regarded the true tax base as 
income, with luxury expenditure being merely an indication 
of the size of one’s income. In the debate on the Bill, Pitt 
explained that “the fairest criterion for judging of the 
proportions which ought to be paid by the various classes of 
society according to their income, was the return of the 
assessed taxes.”25 The multipliers employed in the Triple 
                                         
18 20 Geo II, c 10 (1747). 
19 37 Geo III, c 108 (1797). 
20 17 Geo III, c 39 (1777). 
21 (1798) 38 Geo III, c 16. 
22 Debate on Mr. Pitt’s Proposition for Trebling the Assessed Taxes, 
December 4, 1797, Para. 1066 - 1089.  At para. 1068 the clerk wrote: “It 
was his [Pitt’s] intention, therefore, as these [taxes on servants, horses, 
carriages, dogs and watches] were chiefly articles of luxury, to triple the 
duties upon the latter.” 
23 For slightly different explanations see P.E. Soos, The Origins of 
Taxation as Source in England (1997) Amsterdam, IBFD Publications 
145; and B.E.V. Sabine A Short History of Taxation London, Butterworths 
(1980), 113. 
24 38 Geo III, c 16, §1. 
25 Debate on Mr. Pitt’s Proposition for Trebling the Assessed Taxes, 
December 4, 1797, Paras 1066 – 1089, para. 1067. 
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Assessment operated to create a crude progressive scale for 
taxing the surrogate of income that was its target. For 
instance, if an individual’s 1797 taxes assessed on male 
servants, carriages, and saddle and carriage horses came to 
less than £25 the sum was multiplied by three, but if it was 
£50 or more the sum was multiplied by five.26 
One problem with the Triple Assessment was that people 
who had a good portion of their wealth tied up in assets that 
the tax caught, but who were not hugely wealthy, risked 
paying a significant fraction of their income in tax: at least, a 
fraction that at the time people thought to be too high. This 
potentially inequitable result had always been a flaw in the 
assessed taxes’ strategy of using expenditure as a surrogate 
for income. The greatly increased rates of the Triple 
Assessment, together with the steep scale created by the 
progressive increase in the factors used to multiply the 1797 
rates, risked bringing the consequences of this flaw home to 
taxpayers’ pockets with a vengeance. 
Pitt’s remedy was to add a rider to abate the tax in 
proportion to people’s income. There was another progressive 
scale for this purpose. People with annual incomes under £60 
had to pay a maximum of one one hundred and twentieth of 
their annual income. The scale rose by twenty-nine 
increments to ten per cent for incomes over £200 a year.27 The 
schedule to the Triple Assessment set out rules for estimating 
income, rather than calculating it. The schedule contained 
nine “cases” of income, such as income from lands derived by 
owners and tenants, as well as income from professions, 
trades, vocations, annuities, interest, rent charges, and so on.28 
That is, not only did the concept of income precede the 
enactment of the United Kingdom’s first income tax, but the 
schedular and case system that remains a salient feature of 
that tax to this day29 has deeper historical origins. 
The Triple Assessment was widely evaded and did not last 
long. Parliament replaced it in 1799 with the income tax 
proper,30 which taxed income directly rather than via a 
surrogate. There was a progressive rate, which peaked at ten 
per cent for incomes of £200 or more. “Income” was defined 
as income from land, trade, annuities and professions. The 
                                         
26 38 Geo III, c 16, §1. 
27 Cobbett, W, 33 Parliamentary History, (1797-1798, 38 Geo III) 1076 
(Pitt). 
28 (1798) 38 Geo III, c 16, Schedule I. 
29 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (UK). 
30 39 Geo III, c 13. 
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idea of schedules, carried forward from the Triple 
Assessment, was not used initially, but was added in 1803.31 
The income tax of 1799 inherited the very concept of 
income that Parliament had used the year before to abate the 
Triple Assessment: a regular flow that is measured annually. 
This is the concept that has descended to us today. It is the 
same concept that has worked its way through the law of 
trusts. Simply, the judicial concept of income adopts the 
ordinary meaning of the word, little informed by the views of 
economists. 
The foundations of income tax 
Parsons may have been wrong about the origin of the judicial 
concept of income as a tax base, but he was correct that 
income taxation has congenital and incurable defects. He was 
also correct that these defects lie in the fact that income tax 
law needs a concept of income at its core. Let me first 
examine the defects, and then try to explain why they are 
incurable. 
The defects are a function of the fact that income tax law is 
separated from its subject matter. Looked at another way, tax 
law’s concept of income is not income itself but a simulacrum 
of income. The separation of income tax law from its subject 
matter can be seen best in the law’s efforts to tax business 
profits. Business profits arise independently of the law, and 
sometimes even in spite of the law. They are not a result even 
of contract law, let alone of tax law. They are the result of 
people’s economic transactions with one another. The 
fundamental problem of any income tax law is that it cannot 
tax economic transactions directly. Rather, it taxes the legal 
forms that we use to represent economic transactions.32 
Let me illustrate with a comparison from criminal law.  Ms 
Turpin and Ms Good look very much alike, but Ms Turpin is 
a robber and Ms Good a teacher. One of Ms Turpin’s victims 
gets a good look at her and manages to compose an identikit 
                                         
31 43 Geo III, c 22. 
32 Exceptionally among common law jurisdictions, the United States of 
America tries to circumvent this problem by employing a substance-over-
form approach in tax cases. Gregory v Helvering 293 US 465 (1935). The 
United States has not always managed to maintain this approach. See, eg, 
the cases known as the “Mexican railcar cases”, such as Chicago, 
Burlington, & Quincy R Co v United States, 455 F. 2d 993 (Ct Cl 1972) 
and Missouri Pacific Railroad Co v United States, 497 F. 2d 1386 (Ct Cl 
1974). For a recent discussion and references, see P.A. Glicklich and M.J. 
Miller “Appeals Court adheres to precedent, tells IRS that it’s too late to 
issue regulations” in Glicklich & SH Goldberg, Selected US Tax 
Developments, newsletter of Roberts & Holland LLP, New York, (2001). 
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portrait. The portrait is a good likeness of Ms Turpin, but it 
looks even more like Ms Good. On these facts, nobody would 
suggest that Ms Good, the teacher, committed the crime. In 
tax law, however, a taxpayer crafts a series of legal 
transactions to represent an underlying economic substance. 
Either calculatedly or not, the legal transactions sometimes 
look more like some other economic substance. Perhaps what 
is economically a partnership looks more like a mortgage. 
Absent an avoidance rule, tax law will ordinarily tax the 
transaction as a mortgage, and not as a partnership. We can 
compare that characterisation to criminal law finding Ms 
Good guilty of robbery because the victim’s simulacrum of 
the robber looks more like Ms Good than Ms Turpin. 
Criminal law does not work like that, but income tax does. 
Ectopia 
As I have said, tax law generally taxes the results of legal 
transactions rather than their underlying economic effect. The 
courts are always telling us that tax law does not tax on the 
basis of economic equivalence.33 But the problem is deeper. 
In order to make income tax work at all, the law must make a 
number of assumptions that are not in fact correct, 
assumptions as to both the factual and the legal nature of the 
taxpayer’s income. The effect of these assumptions is that the 
base that the law taxes is removed even further from the facts 
of the case. 
I have written several articles on this phenomenon,34 which 
I call “ectopia”. “Ectopia” means “displacement” or 
“dislocation”. We see it in “ectopic pregnancy”, meaning a 
pregnancy that develops in the wrong place. Like the ectopia 
of a pregnancy in the fallopian tube, the ectopia of the concept 
of income is pathological and incurable. 
                                         
33 Eg Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd [1971] 
NZLR 641, 648 PC. 
34 “Ectopia, formalism, and anti-avoidance rules in income tax law” 
(1994) in W. Krawietz N. MacCormick & G.H. von Wright (eds) 
Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal 
Systems, Festschrift for Robert S. Summers, Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 
367-383; “Philosophical and design problems that arise from the ectopic 
nature of income tax law and their impact on the taxation of international 
trade and investment”, (1995) 13 Chinese Yearbook of International Law 
and Affairs, 111-139, reprinted as “Ectopia, tax law, and international 
taxation” [1997] British Tax Review 383; “Can income tax law be 
simplified?” (1996) 2 NZ Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 187; 
“Should tax legislation be written from a principles and purpose point of 
view of a precise and detailed point of view?” [1998] British Tax Review 
112; see also “Why is tax law incomprehensible?” (1994) British Tax 
Review 380-393. 
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By an apt coincidence, the secondary meaning of 
“income”, which has nothing to do with tax, involves a 
problem that is literally pathological. An “income” as a 
tumour or “a morbid affection of any part of the body”.35 My 
thesis is that the metaphorical pathology of income tax law is 
so extreme that it makes tax law a different species from other 
kinds of law. As physiological incomes are different from 
healthy flesh, so income tax law is different from other law. 
Some people in the audience have been kind enough to read 
my articles. In deference to those charitable people I shall not 
deal with ectopia at length, but I summarise my major themes. 
The fundamental difficulty is that we cannot have an 
income tax without a concept of income. For a number of 
reasons, our concept of income must be artificial. I have 
mentioned one, the fact that we tax a legalistic simulacrum of 
transactions rather than the transactions themselves. Other 
reasons include the problems of place and of time. 
The problem of place arises in connection with 
international transactions. Income tax law assumes that all 
income can be located in one jurisdiction or another as a 
matter of physical fact, or, as Isaacs J put it, as “a hard, 
practical matter of fact”.36 Almost any example of an 
international transaction will dispel this assumption. Where is 
the source of the profit that a multi-national company makes 
on selling a computer to a retail buyer in Sydney? In one 
sense the question makes no sense. Profit is a net concept, the 
difference between receipts and expenditure. A difference 
cannot exist physically in space. 
From another point of view the question makes a little 
more sense, in that a fraction of the multi-national company’s 
profit comes, no doubt, from activity at each of its 
manufacturing plants, its head office, its despatch department, 
its marketing department and its treasury administration, to 
name only some of the more obvious profit centres. However, 
anyone with the barest acquaintance with transfer pricing 
rules and practices will appreciate that dividing profit among 
these centres is an inexact process that uses surrogates for 
truth rather than the underlying truth itself. 
The problem of time is worse. Ideally, we would wait for a 
business to go through its whole life, from foundation to 
liquidation, before determining whether there had been profits 
and, if so, how much they were. Of course, tax systems, like 
shareholders, cannot wait so long; so, like accountants, tax 
                                         
35 Dialect, Northern or Scottish, Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed 1989. 
36 Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1918) 25 CLR 183, 189–
190. 
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authorities require businesses to divide their lives into periods 
delimited by dates. Both accountants and tax law always use 
twelve months, but there is no special reason for this 
convention apart from convenience. 
One result is that Parliament must legislate so that receipts 
and expenses are treated not as the taxpayer actually meets 
them, but as they might have occurred had they been spread 
evenly over time. Income smoothing for farmers is a good 
example.37 
I have discussed some problems of timing to show how tax 
law must distort facts and law in order to operate. But the 
major problem that relates to time is the distinction between 
capital and revenue. An annual taxing system must have this 
distinction, but the distinction causes capital and revenue to 
be treated differently, even though they are essentially 
fungible, with all the consequences that we know. 
None of this is to criticise Parliament’s response. 
Parliament cannot allow clever people to defer receipts or to 
create contrived interest deductions. If Parliament must create 
and tax a simulacrum of interest payments rather than actual 
interest payments that is understandable. It is probably even a 
good thing.38 My point is more fundamental. It is that an 
income tax system cannot work without such pretences. 
Criticisms of the ectopia thesis 
I have tried to explain the thesis that income tax law is 
different in kind from most other law because of the 
dislocation between income tax law and the facts to which it 
relates. People have responded with various criticisms or 
questions, which are directed to suggesting that income tax 
law is not so very unusual. This evening, I shall address just 
one of those criticisms, that the law is well used to fictions. 
Are not the assumptions that give us our concept of income 
just examples of legal fictions? I shall attempt to answer that 
question first generally and then particularly. 
Regarding the matter in general, it is a characteristic of law 
as an institution to enjoy an almost symbiotic relationship 
with its subject matter. When sovereigns legislate, they make 
sure that their laws relate as closely as possible to the subject 
matter of those laws, if only for efficiency. A sovereign who 
wants to forbid assault does not create an offence of 
consensual hugging, at least not intentionally. But a sovereign 
who wants to tax the profits of hire purchase transactions 
efficiently may pass a law that pretends that hire purchase 
                                         
37 Eg Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Division 392. 
38 Eg Income Tax Act 1996 (NZ) subpart EH. 
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transactions are credit sales. Section FC 10 of the New 
Zealand Income Tax Act 1994 is such a provision. Australia 
introduced Division 240, a provision that contains rules that 
have a similar effect, in the Tax Law Amendment Bill (No 3) 
of 1999. The new rules remain in Bill form at the time of 
writing, but they are expected to be enacted during 2001. 
Economically hire purchase transactions are credit sales, but 
that is neither their legal form nor their legal substance. To be 
effective, tax law must pretend that they are something else. 
Credit is as different from hire purchase as a hug is from an 
assault, but such recharacterisations are commonplace in tax 
law. The general point is that, unlike the position in respect of 
other forms of law, the separation between tax law and its 
subject matter is real, inherent, and unavoidable. I shall try to 
demonstrate that tax law uses fictions to bridge this 
separation, whereas the role of fictions in other areas of law is 
less fundamental. 
Fictions 
I pass now to legal fictions more specifically. My thesis is that 
the fictions of income tax law are of a different character from 
other legal fictions. I shall illustrate by considering several 
fictions from history. Roman law had many fictions. For 
instance the fictio Legis Corneliae addressed the problem of 
Romans dying in captivity. If a Roman was captured he lost 
his citizenship, and with it his capacity to make a valid 
testament. The Romans glossed the Lex Cornelia with a 
fiction that for succession purposes Roman citizens should be 
deemed to have died at the instant of capture, while still free 
men and citizens.39 
That is a fiction from Roman law. Two fictions from the 
common law are the doctrine of trover and the concept of 
attractive nuisance. When you sued people for the return of 
your goods you pleaded that they had found them, even if the 
defendant had taken the goods by force. This pleading was to 
bring your claim within the form of action of trover and 
detinue, which did not allow for theft.40 The courts well knew 
                                         
39 Justinian The Institutes, translated and annotated and with commentary 
by T.C. Sandars, 7th ed (new impression) London 1962, 180. The Lex 
Cornelia de falsis (BC 81) provided the same penalty for forging the 
testament of a person dying in captivity as for forging the testament of 
someone dying in his own country. The law could not have intended to 
attach a penalty to forging a testament that was invalid. Accordingly, it 
must be assumed that the deceased had the power of making a testament 
both when he in fact made it and when he died. 
40 Blackstone III Private Wrongs 153, 3rd ed London 1862, 160 – 161. 
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what was going on and assumed the fictional fact that the 
defendant had indeed found the goods. 
My second common law example is the attractive 
nuisance. An attractive nuisance is something on your land 
that is dangerous but that attracts children to play on it. The 
common law said that you did not have to worry as the 
children were crushed under tons of falling scrap metal or had 
their limbs torn off by locomotive turntables that were out of 
control. You did not invite the children; they were trespassers 
and they got what was coming to them. Occasionally the 
courts found all this too robust and held that people leaving 
attractive but dangerous articles on their land must be taken to 
have issued an invitation to come in and play on those 
articles; so the maimed children were not trespassers, and the 
occupiers were liable.41 
The three fictions that I have mentioned share a common 
characteristic: by implication, they created rules that someone 
could have drafted expressly. Rome could have ruled that the 
wills of former citizens dying in captivity were valid. England 
could have created a form of action for suing a thief for one’s 
goods or could have passed a statute providing for a greater 
degree of liability on the part of occupiers, as in fact England 
did many years later.42 
The fictions of income tax law are very different. The 
classic legal fiction entails pretence, but taxation fictions 
entail duplicity. The pretence of the classic legal fiction is a 
roundabout route to a just result that courts employ when a 
direct route is not available. In contrast, the duplicity of a 
taxation fiction is a necessary part of the route of one’s legal 
argument and even part of the result of the argument. Let me 
illustrate. 
Rules that spread interest that is paid on day one over the 
life of a loan assume expressly or impliedly that the interest is 
paid at regular rests.43 Rules that attribute the income of 
foreign trustees44 or of foreign companies45 to Australian 
residents assume impliedly that the Australian residents in 
question indeed derive the income. 
                                         
41 Sioux City & Pacific Rly Co v Stout (1873) 17 Wall. 657 (US SC), City 
of Pekin v McMahon 154 Ill 141 (1895), and United Zinc v Bruitt 258 US 
268, 275 (1921) per Holmes J. But see Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358 
HL. 
42 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. 
43 Eg, New Zealand Income Tax Act 1994, subpart EH (the qualified 
accrual rules). 
44 Eg Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 s 97(1)(a). 
45 Eg Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 Part X, Division 2, Subdivision B. 
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Take a more complex example: the basic assumption of 
income tax law that there is a logical real-world distinction 
between capital and revenue is a fiction. There are 
innumerable pairs of cases that illustrate the flaws in that 
assumption, but I’ll use the classic teacher’s comparison 
between Californian Oil Products Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation46 on one hand and Heavy Minerals 
Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation47 on the other. In 
both cases, the business of the taxpayer was destroyed. Both 
taxpayers received compensation for the loss; but Californian 
Oil Products’s compensation was capital and Heavy 
Minerals’s compensation was revenue. Heavy Minerals was 
the later case; so the court had to distinguish Californian Oil 
Products. Windeyer J distinguished the earlier case by 
explaining that Californian’s business was destroyed as a 
matter of law, whereas Heavy Minerals’s business was 
destroyed only as a matter of fact. That analysis is correct 
from the point of view of a tax lawyer, but a tax payer could 
be forgiven for finding it unpersuasive. 
Californian’s problem was that its American principal, the 
Union Oil Company, decided not to sell it any more oil, 
terminated Californian’s purchasing contract, and paid 
compensation. Heavy Minerals’s business was mining and 
selling the product, rutile. The company’s difficulty was that 
the world price of rutile fell below Heavy Minerals’s cost of 
production. The company had protected itself against this 
eventuality by forward sales contracts, but its customers 
preferred to cancel the contracts and compensate Heavy 
Minerals for its loss of profits rather than to buy rutile from 
Heavy Minerals and sell it at a loss. 
In effect, Sir Victor Windeyer told Heavy Minerals to 
brace up and not be so feeble. It was in this case that he 
coined his famous apophthegm, “He ain’t heavy, he’s my 
mineral”. That’s thought to be a reference to Sir Peter Abeles, 
who was one of the principals of Heavy Minerals. His Honour 
told Sir Peter that unlike the poor fellows in Californian Oil 
Products, who had been eviscerated by the perfidious 
Americans, Heavy Minerals still had a good business. No one 
was telling Sir Peter not to mine rutile. He should just roll up 
his sleeves and get on with it. 
As I have explained, Windeyer J’s distinguishing of 
Californian Oil Products and his reasoning in Heavy Minerals 
were unexceptionable in law. The reason is that the High 
Court was not purporting to calculate Heavy Minerals’s tax 
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liability on the basis of the profit from its actual economic 
business, but on the basis of the contracts that were used as 
the legal vehicle for that business and on the basis of the 
rights and duties that formed the legal context of the business. 
Sir Victor was correct that from a legal point of view Heavy 
Minerals’s business remained intact, even though nobody 
wanted rutile at the price that they had to charge. On the other 
hand, Californian Oil Products’s business had depended on a 
contractual right to buy products from the Union Oil 
Company. Once that right was gone there was no legal basis 
for their business. 
All that sounds fine when you say it quickly, but it makes a 
nonsense of any policy of income tax law. In its most general 
sense, the policy of income tax law in respect of businesses 
must be to tax real business profits. Profits from economic 
activity exist in the natural world, but profits defined by law 
are a construction of human thought. Economic profits 
constitute the only reality that a government can tax. Using 
profits defined by law as the vehicle to do the taxing does not 
change the underlying reality, though the result will be to 
over-tax or to under-tax in individual cases. 
Income tax law achieves its policy of taxing business 
profits as best it can by defining a surrogate of business 
profits in legal terms. In this respect, income tax law is an 
imperfect means to an end, because the definition of business 
profits can never be perfectly accurate. In fact, as I have tried 
to point out, the definition is often very inaccurate. The true, 
economic, business profit, which would be the proper subject 
of the tax base if we could ever get at it, is removed from its 
legal simulacrum by an ectopia. 
Other law is different. For instance, if it chooses, tort law 
can redraft itself so as to operate without the fiction of 
inviting children to enter premises to play on dangerous 
turntables. Indeed, it did so in several Occupiers’ Liability 
Acts in the 1950s and 1960s.48 But income tax law cannot 
abandon the fiction of a logical and factual boundary between 
capital and revenue. 
Lon Fuller, the great American jurist of the mid-twentieth 
century, identified several characteristics of legal fictions.49  
He said that fictions are like scaffolding. As the law develops 
we can abandon them without injuring the policy or vested 
                                         
48 Eg Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 (England), Occupiers’ Liability 
(Scotland) Act 1960, Occupiers’ Liability Act 1962 (New Zealand). 
49 Legal Fictions (Stanford, 1967). I thank Dr Alex Frame of Wellington, 
who introduced me to this monograph. 
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interests that they are designed to sustain.50 In contrast, it is 
my thesis that the fictions of income tax law are an integral 
part of the law’s modus operandi. We need fictions because 
income tax law is separated from its factual subject matter. It 
works only by using fictions that pretend that it is not 
separated. Tax law works imperfectly, but it does work. This 
is a curious example of two wrongs making a right, or, at 
least, of a wrong that hides the true answer being partially 
corrected by a second wrong. 
Explanatory utility of the ectopia concept 
I hope that I have persuaded at least some people here this 
evening that I am correct in my conclusion that income tax 
law may be law as tax specialists know law, but it is not law 
as other people know it. Other people reasonably expect law 
to have a close and almost symbiotic relationship with its 
subject matter. Tax specialists know that income tax law’s 
relationship with its subject matter can be so haphazard that at 
times it appears to be almost a matter of random serendipity 
when fact, law, and tax consequence coincide. 
Ross Parsons identified this phenomenon. He took the 
view that it would lead to the demise of income taxation. I am 
not sure that he was correct, for reasons that I shall explore in 
a minute. But first, let me explain that studying the ectopia of 
tax law is not merely an intellectual conceit. The exercise tells 
us a good deal about the nature of income tax law, its inherent 
limitations, and the limitations on what can be done to reform 
it. 
I have discussed these matters in a number of articles. 
Tonight I shall list their conclusions. First, the ectopia of 
income tax law explains why that law is unduly complex. 
People think that with good will and conscientious effort 
drafters should be able to compose income tax legislation that 
is as comprehensible as other legislation. It is true that one 
can make improvements, but income tax law will never be as 
clear as, for example, a criminal code.51 
Secondly, people think that tax statutes could be simplified 
if only they were drafted in broad, principled codes, rather 
than in numerous, detailed, sub-codes.52 That thought is 
                                         
50 Id 70. 
51 “Why is tax law incomprehensible?” (1994) British Tax Review 380-
393; “Can income tax law be simplified?” (1996) 2 NZ Journal of 
Taxation Law and Policy 187. 
52 See, eg, J Avery Jones, “Tax law, rules or principles?” (1996) 17 Fiscal 
Studies 63, 75–76. 
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wrong,53 too, though again it is true that there can be some 
improvements. Nevertheless, because of the problem of 
latifundian legislation by principle I suspect Mr Ralph’s 
recommendations for a consistent entity regime were doomed 
from conception;54 (and I wrote this sentence before I heard 
that the consistent entity proposal had died). 
Thirdly, although ectopia is present throughout the income 
tax system, and is seen everywhere in the distinction between 
capital and revenue, there are some areas of law where 
ectopia is particularly marked. In these areas, modern tax 
systems typically respond with increasingly complex remedial 
fictions that are calculated to bring tax law and its subject 
matter closer together. The many regimes of international tax 
law are the foremost example: increasingly complex rules 
about source and residence; transfer pricing; controlled 
foreign companies; foreign tax credits; and conduit taxation 
demonstrate my point.55 
Fourthly, the ectopia of tax law leads to and, I submit, 
justifies, the enactment of open-ended general anti-avoidance 
                                         
53 “Should tax legislation be written from a principles and purpose point of 
view of a precise and detailed point of view?” [1998] British Tax Review 
112. 
54 Review of Business Taxation, last date viewed 9 July 2001. 
www.rbt.treasury.gov.au/publications/paper4/part5/section13.htm. 
   The Australian Review of Business Taxation under the chairmanship of 
Mr John Ralph published several reports in 1999, from J. Ralph 
(Chairman of Comm) Review of Business Taxation, First Report, A Strong 
Foundation AGPS (1999) to J. Ralph (Chairman of Comm) Review of 
Business Taxation, Final Report, A Tax System Redesigned AGPS (1999). 
The “consistent entity regime” was a version of that hoary perennial, the 
idea that a uniform system of taxation for all business entities, including 
companies, trusts, unit trusts, and so on can only be a good thing. A 
corollary is that a uniform system does not exist now only because tax 
policy has been left to people who cannot see the wood for the trees. 
   It seems that the Australian government had become exasperated with 
the increasing complexity of tax laws that appeared to have resulted from 
leaving tax design to tax experts. In a new approach, it intended that the 
Ralph review should take a practical, businesslike stance, not unduly 
hampered by advice from tax lawyers. As a result, the consistent entity 
regime built up a more formidable head of steam than such proposals 
usually achieve. Its demise came when eventually it was exposed to expert 
scrutiny. What had been reasonably clear to experts from the beginning 
became clear also to higher-level policy makers: that notwithstanding its 
common-sense, intuitive attractions, the consistent entity regime suffered 
from the defects that are endemic to proposals to draft income tax laws on 
the basis of broad, logical, principles of wide application. 
55 “Philosophical and design problems that arise from the ectopic nature of 
income tax law and their impact on the taxation of international trade and 
investment”, (1995) 13 Chinese Yearbook of International Law and 
Affairs, 111-139, reprinted as “Ectopia, tax law, and international 
taxation” [1997] British Tax Review 383. 
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rules like Part IVA of the Australian Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936 and section BG 1 of the New Zealand Income Tax 
Act 1994.56 The gap between tax law and fact that is the 
subject of this lecture means that there are perforce gaps in 
the formal coverage of an income tax statute. The statute 
needs a general, substance-over-form rule to protect the tax 
base. 
People often criticise general anti-avoidance rules for their 
lack of specificity. They say that the imprecision of anti-
avoidance rules erodes the rule of law. I am not sure that I 
agree with that criticism. After all, in the end it is the court, 
not the commissioner, that decides whether a general anti-
avoidance rule applies. But even if the criticism is justified, 
this characteristic of general anti-avoidance rules is part of the 
price we pay for having a tax on income. Income is imprecise; 
so the rules that buttress income taxation must share that 
imprecision. 
This consideration should lead us to reflect on the history 
of general anti-avoidance rules. Often, critics demand 
specificity. Tax commissioners and occasionally Parliaments 
may be sympathetic. They sometimes promulgate guidelines 
or even enact rules to refine the scope of a general rule.57 In 
principle, that approach is bad practice. The point of a general 
anti-avoidance rule is that it should be general. Specificity, 
however well intentioned, risks eroding the effectiveness of 
the rule. 
The tax value method 
A fifth consequence of ectopia is that people are forever 
trying to reform and improve income tax. That is not 
surprising. Ectopia is always with us, it is always causing 
problems, and people are always responding. 
During 2000 and 2001 Australia has examined proposals 
for a major change in the way that it defines income. The new 
idea has been called the “tax value method”.58 The conceptual 
                                         
56 Ectopia, formalism, and anti-avoidance rules in income tax law” (1994) 
in W. Krawietz N. MacCormick & G.H. von Wright (eds) Prescriptive 
Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems, 
Festschrift for Robert S. Summers, Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 367-
383. 
57 See, eg, McBarnett, Doreen and Christopher Wheelan, “The Elusive 
Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control” (1991) 
54 Modern Law Review 848, 860 ff; Lehmann, G, “Judicial and Statutory 
Restrictions on Tax Avoidance”, in Richard E Krever, (ed) Australian 
Taxation, Principles and Practice (Melbourne 1987) 295-313. 
58 Review of Business Taxation, last date viewed 9 July 2001. 
www.rbt.treasury.gov.au/publications/paper4/part2/section4.htm#heading
1. See also footnote 54, above. 
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base is superficially similar to Henry Simons’s definition of 
income,59 that is, the increase in the taxpayer’s net assets over 
time. A short description of the tax value method is “net cash 
flows plus the change in value of assets”. 
The tax value method is a compromise between competing 
policies. On one hand, there appears to be an endeavour to 
bring the concept of income under income tax legislation 
closer to true economic measurement. On the other hand, 
compliance considerations mandate that calculations are 
according to the criteria of accounting rather than of 
economics. In particular, the tax value method does not take 
account of unrealised gains nor of assets that are very hard to 
identify or to value, such as additional market penetration 
achieved by advertising expenditure. Discussion papers60 
appear to be careful to eliminate references to law as much as 
possible, but no doubt legal concepts will continue to play an 
important part. For example, there will be the question of 
determining whether there has been a realisation. 
I hesitate to make detailed comments about the tax value 
method in front of an Australian audience. I would expose my 
ignorance very quickly, if I have not already done so. But I 
hope by generalisation to put the tax value method into the 
analytical framework of this evening’s lecture. First, as Ross 
Parsons explained, the fundamental difficulty with income tax 
law is to define the concept of income. The tax value method 
is an effort to cope with that task. In principle, it should 
approach closer to the economic concept of income than the 
current judicial concept does, because, in principle, 
accounting is more concerned with economic substance than 
is law. In practice, concern about compliance costs and 
practicalities in general may mean that the tax value concept 
of income will not approach much closer to Henry Simons’s 
economic benchmark61 than does the existing judicial 
concept. Secondly, it seems unlikely to be possible to 
eliminate legal concepts entirely. That is, Australian law will 
still have to tax a legal simulacrum, not actual economic 
activity. Nevertheless, the objective is clearly to minimise the 
ectopia between the two. Let us hope that this occurs. Thirdly, 
although the tax value method addresses problems of capital 
and revenue and of timing in general, it faces the same 
problems of source and residence as does the current system, 
but it does not claim to mitigate those problems. They will 
                                         
59 See footnote 6, above. 
60 Eg. Commonwealth Treasury and the Australian Taxation Office, The 
Tax Value Method Canberra 7 February 2000. 
61 See footnote 6, above. 
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remain with us. If Australia adopts it, the tax value method 
may prove to be an amelioration, but it will not be the last 
word. I would keep Australia’s general anti-avoidance rule62 
in the statute in the meantime. 
Why does income tax survive? 
In his lecture, Parsons predicted the demise of income tax. 
Wisely, he did not put a date on his prophecy. He was well 
aware that there are a number of factors independent of 
income tax itself that make it very difficult for governments to 
move to different forms of taxation. He mentioned political 
difficulties in changing to indirect taxes,63 though since 
Parsons’s time Australia has worked through at least some of 
those. More importantly, he pointed out that Australia “cannot 
go it alone in abolishing [the] income tax”.64 The reason is 
that international fiscal relationships, for the most part 
crystallised in double tax treaties, are based on the assumption 
that all jurisdictions use income as their primary tax base. It is 
not practical for a single country to change to a tax that is 
fundamentally different. At least, that is what everyone 
assumes. Whether true or not, that widely held assumption 
might as well be true. 
Parsons was certainly correct about the political and 
international problems of switching from income taxation. 
Nevertheless, his work conveys the impression that he was 
reasonably confident that the demise of income tax was a 
medium-term prospect, essentially requiring not a great deal 
more than international good will. Was he right? 
My estimate is that Parsons was wrong on this point. 
Contrary to Professor Parsons, I believe that income tax is 
with us indefinitely. Internally, and as an institution, income 
tax is terribly flawed. But there are many exogenous factors 
that give it indirect support. I’ll try to list them. 
First, although the last fifteen years or so have seen modest 
reversals of the inexorable growth of the state, it is hard to see 
fiscal retrenchment going much further. Certainly, I cannot 
foresee any modern state reducing its revenue needs enough 
to be able to abandon income tax without replacing it with a 
tax of comparable power. If this conclusion is correct, it 
would seem that the only real alternative to an income tax is a 
direct expenditure tax such as that proposed by Kaldor65 and 
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63 R. Parsons, “Income taxation, an institution in decay”, (1986) 3 
Australian Tax Forum 233, 265. 
64 Id 266. 
65 N. Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax (1955) London, Allen & Unwin. 
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taken up by the Meade Committee,66 or some variant of an 
expenditure tax. Is the income tax so flawed that governments 
will collaborate in the immense international undertaking that 
would be necessary to move everyone at once to an 
expenditure tax? 
People occasionally suggest that an indirect value added 
tax is a possible substitute for income taxation, but prospects 
are not promising. An inherent problem is that value added 
taxes are regressive and require compensating payments to the 
low-paid and to beneficiaries. A value added tax that collected 
anything like an income tax would require compensating 
payments that would reach to middle income levels. Most 
modern states regard the fraction of their citizens who are in 
receipt of benefits as already too high. People would not 
welcome an increase. 
A practical problem with value added taxes is that, apart 
from New Zealand, no country has managed to enact a value 
added tax that is even close to comprehensive. Special interest 
groups and people concerned about regressivity typically 
combine to force Parliaments to insert all sorts of exemptions. 
So long as value added tax rates remain reasonably low an 
economy can perhaps tolerate a non-comprehensive value 
added tax. But a value added tax that is set at a rate high 
enough to replace the typical modern income tax would be 
very distorting. The conditions67 that allowed New Zealand to 
introduce a comprehensive value added tax in 1985 are not 
likely to be duplicated elsewhere. As a result, states are likely 
to continue to settle for value added taxes at sub-optimal rates 
that operate in partnership with income taxes and not as 
replacements for income taxes. 
Another problem is the special position of the United 
States of America. When we speak of major international tax 
reform that most countries will follow we are in effect 
speaking of a movement that America would have to lead, or 
at least join, but for a number of reasons America may be less 
inclined or able to engage in fundamental reform than may 
other countries. Tax is a problem for everyone, but because 
America has managed to keep its taxes to a lower fraction of 
gross domestic product than have other countries tax is not 
quite as serious a problem to America as it is to the rest of us. 
                                         
66 The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, (1978) the Report of a 
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67 Coincidence of: response to a fiscal crisis; steep reduction in income tax 
rates; numerous other regulatory reforms; unicameral legislature; single 
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A further factor is that America is a federal country, which 
makes tax reform more difficult than for some of us. 
Moreover, there is §9(4) of the United States Constitution. It 
reads: 
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to 
be taken. 
In 1895, the Supreme Court held in Pollock v Farmers’ 
Loan and Trust Co68 that §9(4) prohibited Congress from 
enacting an income tax. The reasons were that an income tax 
is a direct tax and it is not a tax that one can apportion over 
the states on a population basis. In 1913, the Sixteenth 
Amendment reversed the Farmers’ Loan case with these 
words: 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the several States, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration. 
On the face of it, §9(4) still prohibits a direct tax on 
expenditure as opposed to income, though this prohibition has 
not inhibited tax reformers from proposing to replace 
conventional income tax with something along the lines of 
Kaldor’s suggestions. For instance, in 1995 Senators Nunn, 
Kerrey and Domenici sponsored a bill for the “USA” or 
“unlimited savings allowance”,69 essentially a Kaldor measure 
that would have taxed expenditure only, using a graduated 
scale. There is also Hall and Rabushka’s “flat tax” proposal,70 
for a cleverly-modified value added tax that, despite its name, 
achieves rate progression at low incomes. The flat tax has 
found supporters in the former presidential candidate Steve 
Forbes71 and Congressman Dick Armey.72 
American scholars debate whether the Sixteenth 
Amendment would authorise these or similar taxes. In a 
lengthy and thoughtful article,73 Jensen argues that it would 
not, because such taxes are both direct and unapportioned, but 
they are not taxes on income. Others reply that they are taxes 
                                         
68 157 US 429 (1895), 158 US 601 (1895). 
69 USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Congress. 
70 R.E. Hall and A. Rabushka, The Flat Tax (2nd ed 1995) Hoover 
Institution Press, Stanford. 
71 E. Tollerson, “Bowing Out: Forbes Quits and Offers his Support to 
Dole”, New York Times, 15 March 1996, at A26. 
72 Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, HR 2060 and S. 1050, 
104th Congress (sponsored by Representative Armey and Senators Shelby, 
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73 E.M. Jensen, “The Apportionment of ‘Direct Taxes’: Are Consumption 
Taxes Constitutional?”(1997) 97 Columbia Law Review 2334. The author 
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discussion on Article 9(4) and the Sixteenth Amendment. 
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on income, for such reasons as that people would use their 
income to pay the taxes.74 Another argument is that the taxes 
may not be taxes on all income, but they are taxes some of it, 
that is, on the portion of taxpayers’ income that they spend.75 
One scholar goes so far as to say that the Constitution more or 
less leaves it up to the Congress to define what it means by 
“income”.76 Even Jensen agrees that it is most unlikely that a 
court would strike down a Federal tax on the basis of 
unconstitutionality.77 Instead, he implies that conscientious 
legislators should not enact such taxes.78 
This summary of current American opinion79 as to the 
taxing power of the Congress suggests that constitutional 
factors would be likely to constitute no more than a mildly 
inhibiting element if it were a matter of enacting an 
expenditure tax. Practically speaking, what is more serious is 
that proposals for major tax reform seem to make little 
progress in the United States. It is hard to think that a 
jurisdiction that still hews to the classical system of company 
taxation is ready for radical reforms. 
A third reason to think that Parsons’s prediction of the 
near-imminent demise of income tax will not come to pass is 
a question of point of view. Most of us who study income tax 
from a legal perspective tend to focus on the taxation of 
businesses, because that is the most interesting part of income 
tax and that is where most of the problems lie. But we must 
not forget that most income tax is paid on wages and salaries 
and on passive income, with very little practical difficulty. 
Ectopia chiefly affects business income, which produces a 
significant but not overwhelming fraction of tax receipts. Are 
the problems of taxing business income enough to persuade 
the modern state to undertake the upheaval of changing its tax 
system? 
Fourthly, tax departments have a bad press, so that we tend 
to underestimate the very significant advances that they have 
made in the last twenty years or so. Increasing use of self-
assessment and increasing computerisation together mean that 
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76 M.E. Kornhauser, “The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the 
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tax commissioners can undertake more auditing with fewer 
resources, thus counteracting some of the shortcomings of the 
tax base, at least from the point of view of the state, if not of 
the business taxpayer. 
Fifthly, the very availability of computers enables tax law 
to take measures to minimise at least some of the effects of 
ectopia. For instance, the New Zealand financial transactions 
rules require taxpayers to calculate income according to yield 
to maturity formulas.80 This regime thus brings the relevant 
tax law much closer to the economic facts to which it relates. 
Practically speaking, that development could not have 
occurred without people having computers for the 
calculations, or at least programmable calculators. 
Finally, may I advance a hypothesis. This hypothesis is 
that transitional and political difficulties may mean that it is in 
practice impossible to change one major tax for another. At 
any rate, no one has done it yet. For this purpose, I am not 
sure how I should define a “major tax”: perhaps a tax that 
collects more than twenty per cent of gross domestic product. 
It is true that countries have managed to change from one 
minor tax to another. In 1799 England changed from the 
Triple Assessment to the income tax. Australia has just 
changed from wholesale sales taxes to a value added tax.81 
But in 1799 neither the Triple Assessment nor the income tax 
had anything like the importance that income tax has today; 
and by the criterion that I have suggested neither the 
Australian wholesale sales taxes nor the new goods and 
services tax can be classed as a major tax in the sense in 
which I am using the term. In Australia, income tax, the real 
workhorse, has kept going in the background. 
It may be possible that two potentially major taxes can co-
exist and that Parliament can steadily increase the rate of the 
new tax and reduce the rate of the old tax until the old tax is 
gone. That might be a theoretical strategy for moving from an 
income tax, if there were a suitable candidate to be the new 
tax. But a switch from income tax to expenditure tax cannot 
be achieved gradually. The two taxes could not apply at the 
same time to the same taxpayer. It’s all or nothing. Practically 
speaking, “all” may not be a possibility. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion may be shortly stated. First, Professor Ross 
Parsons was correct that income tax law suffers from 
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congenital defects. On the other hand, he was wrong in his 
opinion that these defects came from adopting as its core 
element the concept of income of trust law. True, the idea of 
income is the same in both branches of the law, but that is 
because the Australian/United Kingdom common law has but 
a single concept of income. 
Thirdly, the source of the concept of income is in a sense 
not relevant, in that inherent in any income tax is a concept of 
income that cannot avoid being flawed. The reason is that, 
unlike most law, tax law cannot avoid being separated from 
its factual subject. 
Fourthly, the separation, or ectopia, from which income tax 
law suffers has as one of its symptoms a number of concepts 
that are similar to legal fictions, but that are more 
fundamental to the law than are legal fictions as ordinarily 
understood. 
Fifthly, the ectopia of income tax law offers an explanation 
for a number of the more puzzling aspects of this branch of 
the law, including its complexity and its incoherence. These 
same factors may justify states in adopting general, open-
ended anti-avoidance rules, despite the erosion of the rule of 
law that seems characteristic of such rules. 
Bearing these factors in mind, it is unsurprising that 
Professor Parsons was pessimistic about the future of income 
tax law and foresaw its demise. Nevertheless, Parsons may 
have given insufficient weight to exogenous factors. Even 
more pessimistically, we may predict that these factors will 
preserve income tax and that it will continue. Our pessimism 
may be tempered by the thought that however imperfect 
income tax is as a measure to gather revenue, as a subject of 
study it has never ending fascination.  
